measuring faithfulness
On Measuring Faithfulness of Natural Language Explanations
Parcalabescu, Letitia, Frank, Anette
Large language models (LLMs) can explain their own predictions, through post-hoc or Chain-of-Thought (CoT) explanations. However the LLM could make up reasonably sounding explanations that are unfaithful to its underlying reasoning. Recent work has designed tests that aim to judge the faithfulness of either post-hoc or CoT explanations. In this paper we argue that existing faithfulness tests are not actually measuring faithfulness in terms of the models' inner workings, but only evaluate their self-consistency on the output level. The aims of our work are two-fold. i) We aim to clarify the status of existing faithfulness tests in terms of model explainability, characterising them as self-consistency tests instead. This assessment we underline by constructing a Comparative Consistency Bank for self-consistency tests that for the first time compares existing tests on a common suite of 11 open-source LLMs and 5 datasets -- including ii) our own proposed self-consistency measure CC-SHAP. CC-SHAP is a new fine-grained measure (not test) of LLM self-consistency that compares a model's input contributions to answer prediction and generated explanation. With CC-SHAP, we aim to take a step further towards measuring faithfulness with a more interpretable and fine-grained method. Code available at \url{https://github.com/Heidelberg-NLP/CC-SHAP}
Measuring Faithfulness in Chain-of-Thought Reasoning
Lanham, Tamera, Chen, Anna, Radhakrishnan, Ansh, Steiner, Benoit, Denison, Carson, Hernandez, Danny, Li, Dustin, Durmus, Esin, Hubinger, Evan, Kernion, Jackson, Lukošiūtė, Kamilė, Nguyen, Karina, Cheng, Newton, Joseph, Nicholas, Schiefer, Nicholas, Rausch, Oliver, Larson, Robin, McCandlish, Sam, Kundu, Sandipan, Kadavath, Saurav, Yang, Shannon, Henighan, Thomas, Maxwell, Timothy, Telleen-Lawton, Timothy, Hume, Tristan, Hatfield-Dodds, Zac, Kaplan, Jared, Brauner, Jan, Bowman, Samuel R., Perez, Ethan
Large language models (LLMs) perform better when they produce step-by-step, "Chain-of-Thought" (CoT) reasoning before answering a question, but it is unclear if the stated reasoning is a faithful explanation of the model's actual reasoning (i.e., its process for answering the question). We investigate hypotheses for how CoT reasoning may be unfaithful, by examining how the model predictions change when we intervene on the CoT (e.g., by adding mistakes or paraphrasing it). Models show large variation across tasks in how strongly they condition on the CoT when predicting their answer, sometimes relying heavily on the CoT and other times primarily ignoring it. CoT's performance boost does not seem to come from CoT's added test-time compute alone or from information encoded via the particular phrasing of the CoT. As models become larger and more capable, they produce less faithful reasoning on most tasks we study. Overall, our results suggest that CoT can be faithful if the circumstances such as the model size and task are carefully chosen.